The Battle of Cape Esperance

On the night of 11–12 October 1942, off the north-western tip of Guadalcanal, between Cape Esperance and Savo Island, an American force of four cruisers and five destroyers under Rear Admiral Norman Scott surprised three Japanese heavy cruisers and two destroyers under Rear Admiral Aritomo Gotō, which were on their way to shell Henderson Field during the night. It was the first night surface action of the campaign won by the Americans. The Japanese lost the heavy cruiser Furutaka and the destroyer Fubuki; the flagship Aoba was badly damaged and Gotō mortally wounded. The Americans lost the destroyer Duncan, and the cruiser Boise escaped a magazine explosion by a miracle. The next day aircraft from Henderson Field sank two more Japanese destroyers. The victory had its limits, however: a Japanese convoy carrying reinforcements and heavy artillery, sailing in parallel as a separate operation, unloaded on the island unnoticed.

The battle took its name from the northernmost cape of Guadalcanal. The Japanese call it the Naval Battle off Savo Island (Sabo-tō oki kaisen), and some American authors the Second Battle of Savo Island.

The nights belonged to the Japanese

Since the Allied defeat in the Battle of Savo Island on the night of 8–9 August, the waters around Guadalcanal had been divided between the two sides according to the time of day. By day they were ruled by the aircraft of the American Cactus Air Force at Henderson Field; no Japanese ship within some 300 kilometres of the airfield was safe. By night, however, the sea belonged to the Japanese navy. Fast destroyers and light cruisers – called the Tokyo Express by the Americans and “rat transportation” by the Japanese themselves – ran from their bases in the Shortland Islands and off Bougainville down the channel the Americans called “the Slot”, landed troops and left before dawn. From time to time they also shelled the Marine positions and the airfield in passing. The American fleet, after its losses at Savo and in the Eastern Solomons and the sinking of the carrier Wasp in September, had so far made no attempt to oppose these night runs.

At the beginning of October both sides were preparing for a decision. The Japanese 17th Army of Lieutenant General Harukichi Hyakutake was preparing a great offensive against the airfield, provisionally set for 20 October, and was assembling most of the 2nd and 38th Infantry Divisions at Rabaul. The navy promised to carry troops, equipment and supplies to the island, to step up air raids on Henderson Field and to bombard the airfield from the sea. Heavy guns, vehicles and ammunition that would not fit on destroyers were carried by seaplane tenders, above all the Nisshin. Meanwhile, on 7–9 October, the Marines smashed the Japanese 4th Infantry Regiment on the Matanikau, the unit that was to prepare the jumping-off area for this offensive.

On the American side, the commander of US Army forces in the South Pacific, Major General Millard Harmon, persuaded the area commander, Vice Admiral Robert Ghormley, that the Marines had to be reinforced at once. The commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz, who had visited Guadalcanal in person on 30 September and was growing increasingly dissatisfied with the navy’s passivity, was pressing for the same thing. On 8 October, at Nouméa in New Caledonia, 2,837 men of the 164th Infantry Regiment of the Americal Division embarked on transports, due to reach the island on 13 October. To cover them Ghormley sent Rear Admiral Scott’s Task Force 64: the heavy cruisers San Francisco and Salt Lake City, the light cruisers Boise and Helena, and the destroyers Farenholt, Duncan, Laffey, Buchanan and McCalla. Scott was to intercept any Japanese force heading for Guadalcanal. On 8 October he held night-fighting exercises with his ships, and from 9 October he waited south of Guadalcanal, near Rennell Island, for news of enemy movements.

For 11 October the staff of Vice Admiral Gun’ichi Mikawa’s 8th Fleet at Rabaul planned a particularly important supply run. The seaplane tenders Nisshin and Chitose, escorted by six destroyers under Rear Admiral Takatsugu Jōjima, were to carry 728 soldiers, four heavy howitzers, two field guns, an anti-aircraft gun and large quantities of ammunition. Separately, on the same night, Rear Admiral Gotō’s 6th Cruiser Division – the heavy cruisers Aoba, Furutaka and Kinugasa, all three victors of Savo – with the destroyers Fubuki and Hatsuyuki was to bombard Henderson Field with special high-explosive shells and destroy the aircraft of the Cactus Air Force. Since the American fleet had never yet tried to intercept the night runs, the Japanese did not expect to meet an enemy at sea.

The approach

At 8 a.m. on 11 October Jōjima’s convoy left the anchorage in the Shortlands, and at 2 p.m. Gotō’s force followed. Japanese aircraft from Rabaul and Buin tried to draw off the attention of the Cactus Air Force: at noon a dozen or so Zero fighters flew over Henderson Field, and less than an hour later a wave of 45 G4M bombers escorted by 30 fighters arrived. The raid did little damage, but it prevented the American bombers from attacking the convoy. The last relay of fighters covering the convoy was ordered to stay over the ships until dusk and then ditch; of the six pilots, one was rescued.

At 2.45 p.m. an American reconnaissance aircraft spotted Jōjima’s convoy in the Slot, wrongly reporting it as two cruisers and six destroyers. Gotō’s force, following behind, was not seen. At 4.07 p.m. Scott headed for Guadalcanal. His plan was simple: the ships were to steam in a single column with destroyers at the head and the rear; the cruisers were to open fire on any available target without waiting for orders; the destroyers were to illuminate targets with searchlights and fire torpedoes; and the cruisers’ floatplanes were to find the enemy and light him up with flares. The most modern surface-search radar sets in the force, of the SG type, were in Helena and Boise, but Scott remained in San Francisco with an older and much less capable radar.

At about 10 p.m. Scott’s cruisers launched their floatplanes; one crashed on take-off. At the same time Jōjima’s convoy was rounding the mountainous north-western tip of Guadalcanal; the two formations passed each other without either seeing the other. At 10.20 p.m. Jōjima reported to Gotō that there were no American ships in the vicinity. Later his sailors heard American floatplanes overhead but did not pass this on to Gotō. The Japanese admiral was steaming at 30 knots through bands of heavy rain, in column with Aoba leading, Furutaka and Kinugasa following and the destroyers on the flanks. The Japanese ships had no radar.

At 10.33 p.m., having passed Cape Esperance, Scott formed his column: Farenholt, Duncan and Laffey in the lead, followed by San Francisco, Boise, Salt Lake City and Helena, with Buchanan and McCalla at the rear. The moon had already set and the horizon could not be made out. At about 11 p.m. the floatplane from San Francisco reported Japanese ships close to the Guadalcanal shore – this was Jōjima’s convoy – but Scott, believing that the main force had yet to arrive, did not alter course.

“Roger”

At 11.30 p.m. the Japanese ships emerged from the last band of rain and appeared on the radar screens of Helena and Salt Lake City. Almost at the same moment, at 11.33 p.m., Scott ordered a turn to a south-westerly course so as not to run past Savo. Every ship understood the order as a column turn, each following in the wake of the one ahead – except the flagship San Francisco, which turned at once. Boise followed her, and the three leading destroyers, which had already made the turn, found themselves out of formation, between their own cruisers and the approaching enemy. When Helena and Boise reported radar contacts, Scott assumed they were seeing those very stray destroyers and checked by radio whether Farenholt was returning to her station. The crew of Duncan, believing that the other destroyers had begun an attack, set off on their own initiative to torpedo the Japanese, without informing the admiral.

Despite the confusion, the Americans found themselves in the position every commander dreams of: their column was crossing the course of the Japanese formation, so that the cruisers’ full broadsides could bear on the leading Japanese ships, which could reply only with their forward guns. At 11.46 p.m., with the Japanese now only some 4.5 kilometres away, Helena’s captain asked permission to open fire with the standard formula “Interrogatory Roger”. Scott replied “Roger”, which meant merely that the message had been received. In Helena it was taken as permission – and the cruiser opened fire. Boise and Salt Lake City immediately followed suit, and so, to Scott’s own surprise, did San Francisco.

Gotō was taken completely by surprise. Lookouts in Aoba had sighted the American ships a few minutes earlier, but the admiral assumed they were Jōjima’s force and ordered recognition signals to be made. It was then that the first salvoes struck the ship. Aoba took up to 40 hits in a short time, which destroyed her communications, two main gun turrets and the fire-control centre. Several heavy shells passed through the flag bridge without exploding but killed many men and mortally wounded Gotō. According to the US Naval History and Heritage Command, the admiral’s last word, convinced to the end that he was being fired on by his own ships, was “Bakayarō!” (“Idiots!”). His guns, loaded with shells for the bombardment of the airfield, were still trained fore and aft, and Aoba was flashing a recognition signal with her lights.

Scott, still unsure whether his cruisers were firing on his own destroyers, ordered a ceasefire at 11.47 p.m. – not every ship obeyed – and told Farenholt to make recognition signals. Once he had established where his destroyers were, he resumed fire at 11.51 p.m. The burning Aoba turned away and laid a smokescreen, so many Americans thought she was sinking; fire was shifted to Furutaka. At 11.49 p.m. shells hit her torpedo tubes, starting a large fire, and at 11.58 p.m. a torpedo from Buchanan struck her forward engine room. San Francisco and Boise sighted the destroyer Fubuki at close range and, together with other ships, smothered her with shells; she sank. Kinugasa and Hatsuyuki turned the other way and for the time being escaped the Americans’ attention.

The American destroyers also suffered in the crossfire, hit both by the Japanese and by their own cruisers. Farenholt crossed ahead of San Francisco’s bow to the other side of the column. Duncan, making her lone torpedo attack, caught fire and dropped out of the fight.

At around midnight Scott set off in pursuit. At 12.06 a.m. two torpedoes from Kinugasa narrowly missed Boise. When Boise and Salt Lake City switched on their searchlights to illuminate targets, they became targets themselves. At 12.10 a.m. two shells from Kinugasa exploded in Boise’s forward magazine, between the first and second turrets. The explosion killed almost a hundred men and threatened to tear the ship apart; she was saved by water pouring in through the rents in her hull, which flooded the fire before it reached the powder charges. Salt Lake City and Kinugasa exchanged a few more hits. At 12.20 a.m. the firing stopped, the Japanese vanished into the darkness, and Scott, whose column was beginning to scatter, broke off the pursuit.

Withdrawal and pursuit from the air

While the battle was being fought, Jōjima’s convoy finished unloading off the north coast of Guadalcanal and returned northwards unnoticed by a route south of the Russell Islands and New Georgia. The 728 soldiers reached the island, together with howitzers that shelled the airfield over the following weeks. The badly damaged Aoba managed to join Kinugasa and withdraw up the Slot. Furutaka lost power and sank at 2.28 a.m. some 35 kilometres north-west of Savo; her survivors were picked up by Hatsuyuki. Gotō died aboard Aoba on 12 October; he was posthumously promoted to vice admiral.

On the American side, Boise had her fires under control by 2.40 a.m. and rejoined the force. The burning Duncan was abandoned by her crew at about 2 a.m. Scott, not knowing what had become of her, sent McCalla to search and himself sailed for Nouméa with the rest of the ships. Sailors from McCalla tried to save the wreck, but at around noon Duncan sank north of Savo. Of her crew, 195 men were rescued and 48 were killed. While picking up survivors the Americans came across more than a hundred sailors from Fubuki. The Japanese at first refused to accept help; only after a day did they allow themselves to be pulled from the water, and they were taken prisoner.

Jōjima, on learning of the bombardment force’s defeat, sent back four destroyers: Shirayuki and Murakumo were to look for survivors from Furutaka, while Asagumo and Natsugumo were to cover Kinugasa. On the morning of 12 October SBD Dauntless dive bombers and TBF Avenger torpedo bombers from Henderson Field set out after them. After a near miss Murakumo began trailing an oil slick that guided further aircraft to her; hit by a torpedo, she lay dead in the water, and after further hits she was finished off with a torpedo by Shirayuki. In the afternoon a bomb struck Natsugumo almost amidships, and she sank at 4.27 p.m. The two belonged to the Fubuki and Asashio classes – modern destroyers of which the Japanese were increasingly short.

Losses and assessment

According to Richard B. Frank’s tally, the Americans lost 163 killed: 107 in Boise, 48 in Duncan, 5 in Salt Lake City and 3 in Farenholt. Japanese losses are estimated at 341–454 killed – most of them in Furutaka and Aoba, but also in Fubuki, Murakumo and Natsugumo – and 111 taken prisoner, mainly from Fubuki. As so often in night battles, both sides overestimated their successes. Gotō’s chief of staff, Captain Kikunori Kijima, who took command on the way home, reported sinking two American cruisers and a destroyer, while Scott claimed three cruisers and four destroyers.

It is often written that the Americans sank “one cruiser and several Japanese destroyers”. This needs to be made more precise: in the battle itself one heavy cruiser (Furutaka) and one destroyer (Fubuki) went down, while two further destroyers were sunk by aircraft the following day. Nor were Gotō’s ships carrying reinforcements – their task was to bombard the airfield; the reinforcements came in Jōjima’s convoy, which was left to unload undisturbed. Radar gave the Americans the advantage of surprise, but because of poor communications and the admiral’s distrust of radar reports it was exploited only in part.

Place in the war

For the US Navy, which still remembered the defeat at Savo, this was its first victory over the Japanese in a night surface action and an important boost to morale. The press gave it wide publicity. Boise, which after the battle went for repairs to the Philadelphia Navy Yard, was hailed as a “one-ship fleet” – partly because the censors kept the names of the other ships secret. The Japanese lost the division’s flagship for several months: Aoba returned from the dockyard at Kure only in February 1943.

On the island itself, however, the victory changed little. Jōjima’s convoy had delivered men and heavy guns, and on 13 October, as planned, the 164th Infantry Regiment, covered by Scott, landed on Guadalcanal – the first US Army unit on the island. The very next night, 13–14 October, the Japanese battleships Kongō and Haruna deluged Henderson Field with nearly a thousand heavy shells; on the following nights heavy cruisers – Kinugasa among them – bombarded the airfield; and on 15 October a large Japanese convoy landed some 4,500 troops on the island. Japan had regained command of the waters around Guadalcanal by night, and preparations for the great land offensive, launched on 23 October, were complete. On 18 October Nimitz replaced the dispirited Ghormley with Vice Admiral William Halsey.

The battle also had a delayed effect that worked against the Americans. The victory confirmed US Navy commanders in their belief that night actions would be decided by radar-directed gunfire. They still underestimated the range and power of the Japanese Type 95 torpedoes, the quality of Japanese night optics and the training of Japanese destroyer and cruiser crews. These illusions were put to a costly test in November, in the night actions off Guadalcanal – in the first of them, on 13 November, Norman Scott himself was killed aboard the cruiser Atlanta – and above all on 30 November at Tassafaronga, where Japanese destroyers, losing only one ship, sank one American cruiser with torpedoes and badly damaged three more. Kinugasa was sunk in mid-November, during that same Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. One of Helena’s junior officers later summed up the action off Cape Esperance as a three-sided battle in which chance turned out to be the main victor.