Battle of Mława

The Battle of Mława was one of the first battles of the September Campaign and the largest frontier battle in northern Mazovia. From 1 to 3 September 1939 Army Modlin under Brigadier General Emil Krukowicz-Przedrzymirski defended the shortest route from East Prussia to Warsaw against the German Third Army under General Georg von Küchler. The core of the defence was the 20th Infantry Division (PL), which held unfinished but strong fortifications north of Mława (PL). For three days it threw back attacks by infantry, tanks and aircraft, and German communiqués spoke of “Fortress Mława”. The Germans, however, broke through a weaker sector east of the marshes, at Rzęgnowo (PL), and a Polish counter-attack near Grudusk ended in panic and the disintegration of the reserve 8th Infantry Division. During the night of 3–4 September the army commander ordered a retreat. The columns falling back in daylight suffered heavier losses from the air than in the battle itself.

Name and dates

In Polish historical writing the name “Battle of Mława” has become established; the phrase “defence of the Mława position” is also used. The fighting on the flanks, at Rzęgnowo, Grudusk, Krzynowłoga Mała and Przasnysz, is treated as part of the same battle. German communiqués of the first days of the war spoke of “Fortress Mława” (Festung Mława).

The battle is most often dated from 1 to 3 September 1939, and those are the dates used here. On 1 September the Germans attacked the Mława position, and by the evening of 3 September the front at Rzęgnowo and Grudusk had been broken and the army commander had decided to withdraw. Some authors, among them Ryszard Juszkiewicz, author of a monograph on the battle, and Wojciech Zalewski, also include 4 September, when the 20th Division was leaving its positions and the last outposts were still fighting around midday. Because the defence lasted from dawn on 1 September to the morning of 4 September, the literature also often repeats that the Mława position held out for 80 hours.

Background

The border with East Prussia ran only about a hundred kilometres from Warsaw, and the flat country of northern Mazovia offered few natural obstacles. Under the German plan for the war with Poland, Army Group North under General Fedor von Bock was to cut the Polish Corridor and strike from East Prussia towards Warsaw. That task fell to the Third Army. Its main forces were to advance through Mława and Ciechanów to the Narew and the Bug, and then outflank the capital from the east.

Army Modlin was formed in March 1939, when Polish–German relations sharply deteriorated. It was to cover the approaches to Warsaw and Płock, delay the Germans and, as a last resort, fall back to the line of the Narew and the Vistula, holding the crossings at Modlin and Pułtusk. Krukowicz-Przedrzymirski decided to push the defence as far north as possible and accept battle right on the border. The centre of the deployment was held by the 20th Infantry Division under Colonel Wilhelm Lawicz-Liszka (PL) (also known in the literature as Liszka-Lawicz). On the left flank stood the Nowogródzka Cavalry Brigade under Brigadier General Władysław Anders, on the right the Mazowiecka Cavalry Brigade (PL) under Colonel Jan Karcz (PL). The 8th Infantry Division (PL) under Colonel Teodor Furgalski (PL) was to stand in reserve near Ciechanów. Further east, beyond the Orzyc, the border was covered by the Independent Operational Group Narew (PL).

The 20th Division, whose peacetime garrisons were at Baranowicze, Słonim and Prużana, was mobilised as early as 22–23 March 1939 and moved to Mazovia. In the summer it was shifted up to the border. In mid-July its soldiers, directed by the commander of the 20th Engineer Battalion, Major Juliusz Levittoux (PL), began building fortifications on the hills above the valley of the Mławka (PL), and from 12 August also at Rzęgnowo. Work went on in three shifts, at night by searchlight, with help from the local population. The position consisted of two sectors separated by the Niemyje marshes: the longer Mława position, defended by the 78th and 80th Infantry Regiments, and the Rzęgnowo position east of the marshes, held by the 79th Infantry Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Konstanty Zaborowski. The lines of trenches were protected by barbed-wire entanglements, anti-tank ditches and rows of railway rails driven into the ground. The work was not finished by the outbreak of war. As of 28 August, 45 of the 93 planned reinforced-concrete bunkers on the Mława position were complete, and at Rzęgnowo, according to Juszkiewicz, only 5 out of 30. Fifty-four bunkers survive to this day.

The defence was overstretched. The 20th Division held a sector about 31 kilometres long, whereas regulations provided for about 7 kilometres per division, and Army Modlin as a whole had to cover a belt about a hundred kilometres wide. Because general mobilisation was announced only on 30 August, the Mazowiecka Cavalry Brigade took up its positions in the last days of August, and its sector was far less well prepared than that of the 20th Division.

Forces and commanders

By Juszkiewicz’s calculations the reinforced 20th Infantry Division numbered about 21,000 men and the Mazowiecka Cavalry Brigade about 6,000. Army Modlin as a whole had about 45,000 men. The Mława position was held by the group of the division’s infantry commander, Colonel Franciszek Dudziński, with the 80th Infantry Regiment under Colonel Stanisław Fedorczyk in the central sector. The army had little anti-tank weaponry, two companies of reconnaissance tanks and a few dozen aircraft.

Facing the Mława position was I Army Corps under General Walter Petzel: the 11th and 61st Infantry Divisions and Panzer Division Kempf (PL) under Major General Werner Kempf, improvised in August from the Wehrmacht’s 7th Panzer Regiment and SS units, including the SS regiment “Deutschland”. It had about 7,500 men and an estimated 160 tanks, mostly light. East of the marshes the corps of General Albert Wodrig attacked with the 1st and 12th Infantry Divisions, supported by the 1st Cavalry Brigade. Juszkiewicz reckons that the Germans committed about 98,000 men on the Mława axis, more than twice the strength of the whole of Army Modlin. Polish accounts also stress the superiority of the Luftwaffe, which could send several hundred aircraft from East Prussia over the battlefield.

Course of the battle: 1 September

On the morning of 1 September units of the Third Army crossed the border. The first Polish outposts in front of the Mława position reported Germans at about 4 a.m. On the 20th Division’s position the blow came head-on: the 11th and 61st Infantry Divisions attacked the sectors of the 78th and 80th Regiments, and Kempf’s units advanced through the Białuty forest on the village of Uniszki Zawadzkie (PL), in the centre of the Mława position. German intelligence had underestimated the fortifications. The infantry was halted by machine-gun and artillery fire, and when the tanks of the 7th Regiment joined the attack in the afternoon, they were stopped by an anti-tank ditch and the fire of Polish anti-tank guns. According to Zalewski the Germans committed about 50 tanks and lost six; other accounts give anything from a few to about 25 vehicles destroyed or damaged. In the evening the attackers fell back to their start lines.

Things went worse on the right flank. The German 12th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Brigade attacked the Mazowiecka Cavalry Brigade near Chorzele and Krzynowłoga Mała. The uhlans and rifles held out all day, but at night, threatened with encirclement, they withdrew to a second line running from Rudno Jeziorowe through Łanięta. Juszkiewicz regards this decision, like the withdrawal of one of the 79th Regiment’s battalions from the key strongpoint at Żaboklik, as mistakes that made the Germans’ task easier the next day. Even so, the first day was a success for the defenders. According to Juszkiewicz the 20th Division lost about 150 killed, while German losses were considerably heavier.

Course of the battle: 2 September

On 2 September I Corps renewed its attacks on the Mława position with tanks, supported by artillery and dive-bombers. The 78th and 80th Regiments threw back every attack, although the town itself was burning under the shelling, including a hospital full of wounded. In many places the German infantry could not even get close to the Polish wire.

The decision came east of the marshes. During the night and in the morning army headquarters received false reports that the Germans were crossing the Niemyje marshes. Under pressure from above – according to Juszkiewicz, involving the Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły, himself – Lawicz-Liszka had to pull several companies of the 79th Regiment out of the Rzęgnowo position and send them into the marshes. They found no enemy there and returned to the position exhausted by the march. Meanwhile the German 1st Infantry Division of Wodrig’s corps attacked the weakened sector. In the afternoon it took the hills at Żaboklik and Góra Kamieńska, and the 79th Regiment, having suffered heavy losses, had to give up almost the entire Rzęgnowo position and fall back south towards Grudusk (PL). A gap opened between the regiment and the Mazowiecka Cavalry Brigade, which had again withdrawn to the next line, and the German 12th Division pushed into it. Juszkiewicz calls the decision to pull companies out of Rzęgnowo “a fatal and decisive command error”.

The army commander ordered the 20th Division to defend its eastern flank on the line Dębsk–Nosarzewo and the 8th Division to prepare a counter-attack from the Ciechanów area. Küchler regrouped his forces: Kempf’s division, whose tanks had failed to break through the Mława position, was shifted east to support Wodrig’s corps. The Third Army’s main thrust was now to bypass Mława from the east and reach the rear of the 20th Division. On the evening of 2 September German radio was still reporting that “Fortress Mława fights on”.

Course of the battle: 3 September

On the third day further attacks fell on the Mława position. The Germans managed a few small penetrations, which the defenders eliminated or sealed off. On the eastern flank the situation was growing worse. The Mazowiecka Cavalry Brigade, attacked by Kempf’s division and the 1st Cavalry Brigade, fell back beyond Przasnysz (PL) after fighting near Rostkowo, and the Germans took the town that day. A German armoured reconnaissance unit drove down the road from Przasnysz towards Ciechanów, into the rear of the Polish forces.

The 8th Infantry Division reached the battle area early on 3 September. Its orders were changed several times. In the end, in the afternoon, the division attacked in two diverging directions. The 21st Infantry Regiment under Colonel Stanisław Sosabowski, supported by an artillery battalion, advanced on Przasnysz to relieve the Mazowiecka Cavalry Brigade, and by the evening had taken Czernice Borowe and Chojnowo. The main force, the 13th and 32nd Infantry Regiments with the divisional artillery, moved on Grudusk to close the breach at Rzęgnowo. The 13th Regiment got to within about two kilometres of Grudusk, while the 32nd was held up at Łysakowo. Delivered piecemeal, without good reconnaissance or communications, the attack ran into superior German forces and collapsed.

During the night of 3–4 September, when German armoured vehicles appeared from the direction of Grudusk and saboteurs were active in the rear, panic broke out in the units of the 8th Division. According to some accounts friendly units even exchanged fire. The 13th and 32nd Regiments streamed south in disorder, abandoning their equipment, and some of the men were taken prisoner near Ciechanów. Only Sosabowski’s 21st Regiment withdrew in good order, gathering stragglers along the way and leading them to the Modlin area. In the Rzęgnowo sector the bled-out 79th Regiment could no longer hold against the attacks of the 1st and 12th Divisions. The way into the rear of the 20th Division, which was still holding the Mława position, was opening up.

The retreat

During the night of 3–4 September Krukowicz-Przedrzymirski ordered the positions to be abandoned and a retreat south towards Modlin and Warsaw. By his own account Lawicz-Liszka received the order at about 1 a.m. He opposed a daylight retreat and proposed holding the position until dusk, but the army commander promised air cover. The order reached the forward units by runner and did not get to all of them. Some commanders demanded written confirmation, because the soldiers did not want to leave a position that had not been broken. By about 9 a.m. the division’s main forces were already south of Mława, and at 10 a.m. the Polish troops left the town. Some bunker crews, whom the order had not reached or who refused to withdraw, fought on until midday, until the Germans destroyed them with grenades and flamethrowers. A German communiqué announced that “East Prussian troops have taken the town and the fortifications there in heavy hand-to-hand fighting”. On 4 September Anders was also given command of the 20th Division, but this attempt to unify command came too late.

The columns of the 20th Division marched in daylight across flat, almost treeless country. Throughout 4 September, despite the promises of air cover, German aircraft attacked them. The division was disorganised for a time and lost more men and equipment in this retreat than in three days of defence. Juszkiewicz believes that the long, hurried withdrawal all the way to the line of the Vistula and the Narew, even though the German infantry was not pressing, destroyed the core of Army Modlin more than the fighting at Mława, Rzęgnowo and Grudusk. The Germans, however, did not follow the retreating Poles. Küchler sent the main forces of the Third Army, including Kempf’s division, east towards Różan and Pułtusk and the line of the Narew.

Casualties

Casualty figures are incomplete and vary from source to source. Juszkiewicz estimated Polish losses at about 1,000 killed and 2,000 wounded, and German losses at about 1,200 killed and 4,000 wounded and missing. More recent accounts and commemorative material, among them the town of Mława’s website, give about 1,200 Polish killed and 1,500 wounded, and about 1,800 German killed and 4,000 wounded and missing. On the Polish side the heaviest losses fell on the 79th Infantry Regiment at Rzęgnowo; on the German side on the divisions that attacked the Mława position head-on and on Kempf’s division.

Significance

The Battle of Mława was the first test of the Polish defence on the shortest route from East Prussia to Warsaw. For three days the 20th Infantry Division stopped the advance of a much stronger enemy and never gave up the Mława position to a frontal attack. The Germans called it the “Iron Division”. The battle showed that prepared infantry defences with anti-tank weapons could stop tanks, and the use of a panzer division in a frontal assault on fortifications cost the Germans heavy losses. Juszkiewicz and other historians consider that here the Poles won the fight for time, the Polish Army’s main task in September.

The battle also exposed the weaknesses of the Polish defence. Army Modlin had too few troops on too wide a front, its flanks were poorly fortified, and army headquarters, several dozen kilometres from the battlefield, lacked accurate information on the situation on the right flank. There was no commander on the spot to coordinate the 20th Division and both cavalry brigades. The defeat was sealed by interference from above in the affairs of a single regiment at Rzęgnowo, the failed counter-attack of the 8th Division and the hurried daylight retreat. General Juliusz Rómmel laid the blame for the “Mława tragedy” on the High Command and the Commander-in-Chief. Juszkiewicz disputed this view and also pointed to mistakes by the army and divisional commanders.

After the battle the Third Army moved on the Narew. At Różan and Pułtusk the Germans broke the Polish defences as early as 6 September and pushed south to outflank Warsaw from the east. The 20th Division quickly recovered its fighting capacity and later defended Warsaw’s Praga district until the capital surrendered, while the 8th Division became the core of the defence of the Modlin Fortress. The memory of the battle is kept alive by the Mausoleum of the Soldiers of September in Uniszki Zawadzkie, set up in 1964 in a combat bunker of the 80th Infantry Regiment, the Polish Infantryman monument of 1985, and the surviving bunkers of the Mława and Rzęgnowo positions, one of the longest almost completely preserved complexes of light Polish fortifications from the interwar period.