The landing at Lingayen Gulf

Before dawn on 22 December 1941, 76 Japanese transports escorted by cruisers and destroyers entered Lingayen Gulf on the west coast of Luzon. On board was the main body of Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma’s 14th Army – according to the American official history, which drew on Japanese documents, 43,110 men, with artillery and several dozen tanks. A few minutes after five in the morning the first landing craft reached the shore near Agoo in La Union province. By evening the Japanese held a stretch of coast several dozen kilometres long and had reached the roads running across the central plain of Luzon straight to Manila. The landing, which the American command had been expecting for two weeks, sealed the island’s fate. Within two days General Douglas MacArthur abandoned his plan to defend the beaches and ordered a retreat to the Bataan peninsula.

The Japanese in northern Luzon

The first stage of the Japanese plan succeeded beyond expectations. The attack on Clark Field on 8 December and the raids that followed destroyed American air power in the Philippines. After Cavite was bombed on 10 December, the Asiatic Fleet sent its surface ships south. Between 8 and 12 December the Japanese landed on Batan Island, at Aparri, near Vigan and at Legazpi, meeting no serious resistance. War chronologies record under 13 December that Homma’s troops had “firmly established themselves” in the northern Philippines. That was accurate: on 12 December Colonel Tanaka’s detachment had taken Tuguegarao airfield in the Cagayan valley, the Kanno detachment held Vigan and the airfield at Laoag, and fighters of the Japanese Army Air Service had begun operating from airfields on Luzon itself. Homma himself was still on Formosa, directing preparations for the main landing from there. On 14 December his chief of staff flew to Aparri and ordered Tanaka to unite the two detachments and march south along the coast towards Lingayen Gulf. The regiment set out from Vigan on 20 December and on the morning of 22 December reached San Fernando in La Union, a few hours after its comrades had begun landing on the beaches south of the town.

As early as 12 December MacArthur warned Manuel Quezon, President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, to be ready to move to Corregidor island at four hours’ notice. That evening, at the Manila Hotel, he explained to the startled president that this was merely a precaution in case the Japanese landed in many places at once. The troops would then be concentrated on Bataan, the government and headquarters moved to Corregidor, and Manila declared an open city. For the time being, however, the orders were different: defend the beaches and do not fall back from the coastal positions.

The main landing

Lingayen Gulf was the obvious place for a landing. Its shores are lined with wide beaches, and from there roads and a railway run south across the central plain of Luzon to Manila, some 200 kilometres away. The Japanese chose a stretch of the eastern shore of the gulf between Bauang and Agoo, where a narrow coastal lowland separates the sea from the mountains of the Cordillera Central.

The invasion force sailed from three ports: on 17 December from Keelung (Kirun) in northern Formosa, and on 18 December from Mako in the Pescadores and from Takao. Its core was Lieutenant General Yuitsu Tsuchihashi’s 48th Division, formed on Formosa and not yet blooded, but regarded as one of the best motorised divisions in the Japanese army. It was reinforced by the 9th Infantry Regiment of the 16th Division, two tank regiments – between 80 and 100 vehicles according to various tallies – and heavy artillery. Distant cover was provided by the cruisers of Vice Admiral Ibō Takahashi’s 3rd Fleet and two battleships detached from the Malayan operation. American intelligence had known about the approaching convoy since at least 18 December. On the evening of 20 December headquarters warned the troops along the gulf that an expedition of between 100 and 120 ships was on its way.

Between 1.10 and 4.30 a.m. on 22 December the transports dropped anchor. The lead ship overshot its designated position in the darkness, and the others came to a halt scattered over 25 kilometres, so the landing craft had a longer run to the shore. The sea was rough, it was raining, and the radios were swamped. At 5.17 a.m. the first units of the 47th Infantry Regiment came ashore south of Agoo; a quarter of an hour later the 1st Formosa Regiment and the tanks landed near Aringay, and around 7.30 a.m. part of the 9th Infantry Regiment near Bauang. The surf threw the landing craft up onto the beach and capsized them, heavy equipment could not be unloaded, and most of the artillery stayed on the ships all day. Homma, who remained on board, was out of contact with his troops ashore for many hours. At his trial in 1946 he said that this day had been the first of the three critical moments of his campaign.

The defenders exploited this weakness only to a small degree. The American submarine S-38 slipped into the shallow waters of the gulf and sank the transport Hayo Maru, but the other submarines achieved nothing. A few B-17s flying in from Australia attacked the ships to little effect. The shore of the gulf, some 190 kilometres long, was defended by two poorly trained divisions of the Philippine Army, the 11th and the 21st, only one of which had artillery. The Japanese landed in the sector of the 11th Division, where troops were waiting on the beach only at Bauang. There a battalion of the 12th Infantry Regiment with a single heavy machine gun inflicted serious losses on the incoming boats, but the lighter machine guns soon jammed and the Filipinos had to give way. Near Agoo, a battalion sent forward by the divisional commander, Brigadier General William Brougher, was routed by Japanese tanks and reconnaissance troops. Untrained reservists, most of them mobilised only that autumn, in many places fled at the first sight of the enemy.

Damortis and Rosario

Serious resistance came only from Colonel Clinton Pierce’s 26th Cavalry Regiment, made up of Filipinos serving in the regular US Army – the so-called Philippine Scouts – and the best-trained and best-equipped unit on the island. Major General Jonathan Wainwright, commander of the North Luzon Force, sent it before dawn to Rosario and then on to Damortis on the coast. In the afternoon the cavalrymen fought there against advancing infantry, tanks and aircraft. A platoon of five M3 light tanks from the 192nd Tank Battalion, sent to help them, ran into Japanese tanks and anti-tank guns near Agoo. This clash is regarded as the first engagement of American tanks against enemy tanks in the war. The commander’s tank burned out, and the others, badly hit, were later destroyed by aircraft. At around 7 p.m. the Japanese took Damortis. In the evening, as the cavalry fell back along the road to Rosario, Japanese tanks broke into its rearguard. In the darkness, amid panicked riderless horses, the regiment suffered heavy losses. It was saved from complete destruction by Major Thomas Trapnell, who blocked a bridge with a burning tank. By nightfall Rosario, an important road junction where the routes came down from the mountains, was already in Japanese hands.

By the end of the first day the Japanese had linked up with Tanaka’s detachment, seized the passes leading into the mountains, taken Damortis and Rosario, and stood at the gateway to the plain. The units cut off in the mountains at Baguio, the summer capital, looked for a way to withdraw through the mountains, and on 24 December the last Americans left the town. On the gulf, as the sea grew calmer, the artillery and the rest of the troops were being unloaded. In the afternoon Wainwright asked for permission to withdraw behind the Agno River.

Lamon Bay

On the night of 23–24 December, on the other side of the island, in Lamon Bay on the east coast of Luzon some 200 kilometres from Lingayen, 24 transports dropped anchor carrying Lieutenant General Susumu Morioka’s 16th Division, about 7,000 men. Early on 24 December they landed at three points: Mauban, Atimonan and Siain. Brigadier General George Parker’s South Luzon Force was in the middle of regrouping, and all its heavy artillery had been positioned on the west coast, where MacArthur’s staff expected a landing. At Mauban a Filipino battalion fought bravely but could not stop the enemy. The Japanese pushed through the Tayabas mountains towards Manila from the south. Japanese pincers now stood at both ends of the central Luzon plain.

“WPO-3 is in effect”

On 22 December MacArthur was still reporting to General George Marshall that 80,000 to 100,000 Japanese were landing from seventy or eighty transports, while he had about 40,000 men on Luzon “in partially equipped units”. He announced that, if necessary, he would withdraw to Bataan, declare Manila an open city and move his headquarters to Corregidor, which he intended to hold. In reality Homma had less than half of what MacArthur assumed, but the fighting on 22 and 23 December showed that the Philippine Army would not stop the Japanese on the plain. On 23 December MacArthur decided to revert to the pre-war plan that he himself had earlier considered defeatist. The force commanders received a brief message: “WPO-3 is in effect.”

WPO-3, the third version of the Orange plan drawn up for the Philippines, was well known to every officer who had served in the islands for more than six months. It assumed that the forces on Luzon, delaying the enemy on successive prepared lines, would withdraw to the mountainous, jungle-covered Bataan peninsula and, together with the fortresses at the entrance to Manila Bay, hold out until the fleet arrived to relieve them. Wainwright’s forces were to fall back through five delaying lines and hold San Fernando in Pampanga province, at the approach to Bataan, until the troops from the south had passed Manila and crossed the bridges at Calumpit. On 24 December Parker handed over command in the south to General Albert Jones and left to prepare the defence of the peninsula.

Christmas Eve on Corregidor

At noon on 24 December Sutherland gathered the staff and announced that headquarters would move to Corregidor that very evening. In the afternoon Quezon and the American High Commissioner Francis Sayre sailed there with their families aboard the steamer Mayan. After 7 p.m. the ship Don Esteban left the Manila waterfront with MacArthur, his wife and son, and his staff. It was Christmas Eve. The officers sat on deck watching the glow over the naval fuel depot, where more than a million gallons of oil had been set alight earlier. At 9.30 p.m. the ship docked at Corregidor, and on 25 December USAFFE headquarters began operating in the island’s tunnels. Left behind in Manila was the deputy chief of staff, Brigadier General Richard Marshall, whose task was to ship out the supplies and destroy the rest.

The retreat came too late to build up on the peninsula the stocks that WPO-3 had provided for before the war. While preparing to defend the beaches, MacArthur had neglected to stockpile supplies there. Over a few days everything possible was carried by barge from Manila to Corregidor and Bataan, but much was lost. Commonwealth regulations forbade the movement of rice and sugar from one province to another, and permission came too late, so, according to the American official history, some 4,500 tons of rice were left in the government depot at Cabanatuan. The supplies on Bataan were calculated for 43,000 soldiers for six months. In the end some 80,000 soldiers and 26,000 civilian refugees took shelter there, and rations had to be cut by half as early as the beginning of January.

Manila an open city

It is often said that MacArthur declared Manila an open city on 23 December. In fact the decision was taken on 23–24 December, together with the order to retreat. MacArthur notified Washington of it on 24 December, but it was proclaimed only on 26 December, once the government and headquarters had left the capital. That day the newspapers printed the text of the proclamation, radio stations broadcast it all day, a banner reading “Open City. No Shooting” hung on City Hall, and in the evening the blackout was lifted for the first time since the outbreak of war. Radio Tokyo acknowledged receipt of the announcement that same night. Nevertheless, on 27 and 28 December Japanese aircraft bombed the port and the historic Intramuros. The status of an open city was in any case unclear, since for days afterwards troops marched through Manila and supply convoys drove through it to Bataan. The American official history concedes that the city can hardly be regarded as open before 31 December. Violation of the open city’s status later became the first count of the indictment against Homma before an American military tribunal.

Place in the war

The landing at Lingayen Gulf decided the battle for Luzon within two days, although the retreat to Bataan itself was one of the most efficient American operations of the campaign. Wainwright’s and Jones’s forces, falling back from line to line, managed to cross the bridges at Calumpit, which were blown on 1 January 1942, and by 6 January all the main units were on the peninsula. On 30 December, on Corregidor, Quezon was sworn in for a second term as president. On 2 January 1942 the Japanese entered Manila.

The withdrawal to Bataan, however, changed the character of the campaign. Instead of the swift conquest expected in Tokyo, Homma had to conduct a siege lasting many months. The American and Filipino troops, hungry and racked by malaria, held out on the peninsula until 9 April 1942, and on Corregidor until 6 May. On the orders of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, MacArthur left the Philippines in March 1942. Much of what happened afterwards went back to the decisions of those December days: the belated retreat, the rice left at Cabanatuan and the hunger on Bataan, and, after the surrender, the death march in which thousands of American and Filipino prisoners died.