The Hardest Day

Sunday 18 August 1940 went down in the history of the Battle of Britain as “The Hardest Day”. That day the Luftwaffe hurled three great raids at south-east and southern England: at lunchtime against the sector stations at Kenley and Biggin Hill near London, in the afternoon against airfields and a radar station on the coast of Sussex and Hampshire, and towards evening against Hornchurch and North Weald. Several hundred aircraft at a time fought over Kent and Sussex. According to post-war tallies the two sides together lost some 140 aircraft that day, more than on any other day of the battle – more even than on 15 September, regarded as its climax. In the air the British shot down roughly twice as many aircraft as they lost themselves, but the Germans destroyed many machines on the ground. The day that was meant to break the British fighter force ended, the following day, in a conference with Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, at which the head of the Luftwaffe changed the rules of the game for his fighters.

After “Eagle Day” and “Black Thursday”

Five days earlier, on 13 August, the Luftwaffe had begun the main offensive against the British air force called for by Hitler’s Directive No. 17. The first days, however, did not bring the expected results. German intelligence could not tell fighter airfields from bomber bases, naval air stations and training fields, so many bombs fell on targets of no importance to Fighter Command. On 15 August all three air fleets struck simultaneously and suffered such heavy losses that the day became known in Germany as “Black Thursday”. Even so, the staffs remained convinced that the RAF was at the end of its tether. Luftwaffe intelligence, counting the pilots’ inflated claims and underestimating the output of British factories, reckoned that on 17 August the British had only about 300 serviceable fighters. In reality the squadrons had more than 850, with several hundred more in storage units.

The commander of Luftflotte 2, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, persuaded Göring that the airfields should go on being bombed under strong fighter escort, but that instead of dispersing his forces over dozens of targets he should strike at a few of the most important. The choice fell on the sector stations of Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park’s No. 11 Group, from which the squadrons defending London were controlled: Kenley, Biggin Hill, Hornchurch and North Weald. The Germans did not know that each of them housed a poorly protected, above-ground operations room whose destruction would have paralysed the control of the battle throughout the sector. In the west, Field Marshal Hugo Sperrle’s Luftflotte 3 was to strike with dive-bombers at airfields and a radar station on the Channel coast.

Kenley and Biggin Hill

In the morning there was mist over France, and the raid planned for nine o’clock was postponed. At about eleven, Heinkel He 111s of KG 1 took off to bomb Biggin Hill from high altitude, together with Dornier Do 17s and Junkers Ju 88s of KG 76, detailed to attack Kenley. The plan for Kenley was precise: first the Ju 88s were to dive-bomb the hangars; five minutes later the Dorniers were to crater the landing ground from high altitude; and finally 9./KG 76, a Staffel specialising in low-level attacks, was to finish off whatever was still standing. In the clouds over France, however, the formations became separated and the plan fell apart. The bombers were escorted by some 150 Messerschmitt Bf 109s and Bf 110s. British radar estimated the incoming force at 350 aircraft; in reality there were about 260.

The nine Dorniers of the low-level Staffel crossed the Channel just above the waves, below the radar beams, and made landfall at the cliff of Beachy Head. There they were spotted by volunteers at an Observer Corps post, who at once telephoned a warning. The raid’s navigator, Hauptmann Joachim Roth, led the aircraft along the Brighton–London railway line so accurately that they reached Kenley on time. The trouble was that they arrived first: there was no smoke or damage over the airfield, and the ground defences were waiting. The Dorniers swept over the hangars at a height of a few dozen metres, each dropping twenty 50-kilogram bombs, and ran into the fire of Bofors guns, machine guns and the fighters of No. 111 Squadron. On the northern edge of the airfield, rockets that shot steel cables into the air on parachutes were used for the first time in the war. One of the Dorniers became entangled in a cable and crashed; its whole crew was killed. The aircraft carrying Roth, hit from the ground and by Hurricanes, crash-landed in Kent. Roth was killed and the pilot survived with burns. Of the nine Dorniers, four did not return and all the rest were damaged.

Kenley suffered badly. The bombs destroyed several hangars, many buildings and several fighters on the ground, and the sector operations room had to be moved to makeshift premises in nearby Caterham. The airfield was out of action for about two hours. The bombers flying higher ran into a battlefield full of fighters. No. 32 Squadron attacked the Dorniers head-on and broke up their formation so thoroughly that some of them dropped their bombs on railway lines and houses in the area and others turned back. The Ju 88s, arriving over Kenley after the Dorniers, found the target shrouded in smoke and bombed West Malling airfield instead. One of them was shot down by Pilot Officer Bolesław Własnowolski, one of the Polish pilots then flying in British squadrons. The Heinkels of KG 1, well protected by the Messerschmitts of JG 54, bombed Biggin Hill without much interference but also without much effect: the personnel had time to take cover, and the airfield went on operating. Sergeant Elizabeth Mortimer of the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) was marking unexploded bombs on the airfield with flags while the raid was still in progress, and was awarded the Military Medal for it.

The return journey was the hardest part for the Germans. The Bf 109s were running short of fuel, and fresh squadrons were waiting over Kent. Park ordered them not to assemble into one great formation but to attack individually wherever they found the enemy. ZG 26, with its twin-engined Bf 110s, which themselves needed protection, suffered particularly. The RAF lost aircraft too: in the morning Messerschmitts of III./JG 26, led by Hauptmann Gerhard Schöpfel, shot down four Hurricanes of No. 501 Squadron over Kent within two minutes, and in the afternoon fighters of JG 52 strafed aircraft refuelling at Manston.

The defeat of the Stukas

In the early afternoon 109 Junkers Ju 87 dive-bombers of StG 77 and StG 3 took off from the Cherbourg area – the largest formation of Stukas yet seen over England. They were escorted by some 150 Messerschmitts. The targets had been chosen on the basis of indistinct aerial photographs: the Fleet Air Arm airfield at Ford, the Coastal Command base on Thorney Island, the airfield at Gosport and the radar station at Poling in West Sussex. Apart from the radar station, none of them belonged to Fighter Command.

Three groups of Stukas bombed their targets almost unhindered and with great accuracy. The Poling station was so badly damaged that it did not work until the end of August, but mobile radars and neighbouring stations quickly plugged the gap. At Ford fuel tanks, hangars and huts went up in flames; 28 people were killed and about 75 wounded. The fourth group, however – 28 Ju 87s heading for Thorney Island – was intercepted by Hurricanes of Nos. 43 and 601 Squadrons before the escort could cover it. The slow Stukas, diving in formation, were easy targets, and a battle involving several hundred aircraft broke out over the coast from Gosport to Bognor Regis. I./StG 77 lost ten machines in a few minutes, and the Geschwader as a whole, according to German records, 16–17 aircraft destroyed or damaged beyond repair, several more damaged and 26 aircrew killed, among them the Gruppe commander, Hauptmann Herbert Meisel. Since the start of the battle the Luftwaffe had now lost nearly 60 Stukas. The bomber that had spread terror in Poland and France proved defenceless over England against modern fighters.

Towards evening Kesselring sent another 110 or so bombers against Hornchurch and North Weald, but cloud gathered over the targets and the formations turned back, dropping their bombs at random; three civilians were killed in Shoeburyness. During the night single German bombers roamed over England and Wales.

The day’s tally

The figures for 18 August, as for the whole battle, long served propaganda. The British announced 144 German aircraft shot down and admitted the loss of 23 fighters. The Germans claimed to have destroyed 147 British machines for the loss of 36 of their own. Post-war research, above all by the British historian Alfred Price, who devoted a whole book to this day, produced an entirely different picture. The Luftwaffe lost 69–71 aircraft destroyed or damaged beyond repair, and several dozen more returned damaged. 94 German airmen were killed and 40 taken prisoner. Fighter Command lost 27–34 fighters in the air, depending on the study; 31 according to Price. 10 British fighter pilots were killed, one died of wounds and 19 were wounded. On the ground 8 fighters and about 30 aircraft of other types were destroyed, many of them trainers and auxiliary aircraft. In all the RAF lost some 68 machines, but only about 40 of them were fighters, which were what counted in the battle.

Price concluded that the honours of the day went to the defenders. For every British pilot killed, wounded or captured the Germans paid with five airmen, and for every three Spitfires and Hurricanes destroyed they lost five aircraft of their own. Had the battle continued at that rate, the Luftwaffe would have destroyed Fighter Command, but would itself have been on the verge of destruction. The airfields, though battered, kept working: Biggin Hill was not out of action for a moment, and Kenley for only two hours.

The conference at Carinhall

Göring did not command from the coast that day. He was at his estate, Carinhall, near Berlin, where he had summoned the Luftwaffe’s two best fighter pilots: Major Adolf Galland, commander of III./JG 26, and Major Werner Mölders, commander of JG 51. According to Galland’s memoirs and Price’s findings, the Reichsmarschall presented them with the Pilot/Observer Badge in Gold with Diamonds and then immediately gave them a dressing-down over the bomber losses and the fighters’ lack of fighting spirit. Galland and Mölders defended their men, and Göring, to smooth things over, announced that young and successful commanders would take over the Geschwader.

The next day, 19 August, when the loss reports for 18 August reached his desk, Göring called a conference of commanders at Carinhall. It was then, and not on the “hardest day” itself, that the decisions associated with that date were taken. Göring decided that the Luftwaffe, his main source of power, must not bleed to death; it had to defeat the RAF but preserve its strength for the landing, should it come to that. The main topic was bomber escort. The fighter commanders wanted above all “free hunts” – sweeps clearing the sky ahead of a raid. Göring agreed that some of the Messerschmitts should continue to operate in this way, but ordered the rest to stay close to the bombers and not leave them, and the single-seat Bf 109s were also to escort the twin-engined Bf 110s, which could not hold their own against Hurricanes and Spitfires. From now on bombers were to take an escort over fighter airfields. The Stukas were withdrawn from the main battle; they could be used only in exceptionally favourable circumstances. Over the next few days most of Luftflotte 3’s Bf 109 Gruppen were moved to the Pas-de-Calais, under Kesselring, from where they had the shortest flight to England. Göring also ordered that no more than one officer should fly in a bomber crew, because too many experienced commanders had already ended up in captivity or in cemeteries.

On this occasion Göring openly accused the fighter pilots of not defending the bombers stubbornly enough and of lacking the will to fight. In the following weeks, as bomber losses mounted, he went as far as accusations of cowardice. The pilots received the close-escort orders with bitterness. The Bf 109 was at its strongest when it could attack from height and by surprise; tied to slow bombers, it lost speed, height and initiative. Galland wrote after the war that this method of escort ran counter to the very nature of the fighter. The promised change of commanders came quickly: on 22 August Galland took over JG 26, and several other older Geschwader commanders were replaced by younger aces.

Place in the war

“The Hardest Day” closed the first phase of the German offensive against the airfields. For the next few days the weather was bad and the fighting slackened, while the Luftwaffe regrouped. From 24 August Kesselring, now without Stukas, with strong close escort and with most of the fighters concentrated in the Pas-de-Calais, resumed the raids on No. 11 Group’s sector stations. These two weeks, until 6 September, were the most dangerous of the whole battle for Fighter Command: Biggin Hill was bombed several times, and the loss of experienced pilots began to exceed the inflow of new ones. The switch of target to London on 7 September brought the defenders relief, and on 15 September it became clear that the Luftwaffe would not win command of the air.

The Carinhall orders had long-lasting consequences. Tying the fighters to the bombers somewhat reduced bomber losses but robbed the Messerschmitts of their advantage, and the dispute over how to use the fighter arm recurred between Göring and his pilots until the end of the war. The withdrawal of the Stukas from over England showed that the weapon that had brought Germany victory in Poland and France was unsuited to fighting an enemy with modern fighters and radar. The Ju 87 returned to battle where the enemy was weaker in the air: over the Mediterranean, in Africa and on the Eastern Front. And 18 August, the day on which both sides suffered their heaviest losses, remained the best picture of what the Battle of Britain was: a war of attrition in which the Germans lost more than they could replace and misjudged how much strength their enemy had left.