The Battle of Sidi Bou Zid

In mid-February 1943 the Axis powers seized their last chance to strike at the Americans in Tunisia before the British Eighth Army arrived from the south. Under 13 February it is often recorded that Erwin Rommel launched a counter-attack against the Americans in western Tunisia and captured Sidi Bou Zid and Gafsa. The broad picture is true, but the details need correcting. 13 February was the last day of preparations: the attack went in before dawn on 14 February. Nor was it Rommel who struck at Sidi Bou Zid, but two panzer divisions of General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim’s Fifth Panzer Army, commanded in this operation by his deputy, General Heinz Ziegler. Rommel led the second, southern part of the plan and took Gafsa a day later, on 15 February – without a fight, because the Americans had already left it.

The front in central Tunisia

After the failed “run for Tunis” and the defeats at Tebourba and on Longstop Hill, the front in Tunisia settled down for the winter. In the north stood General Kenneth Anderson’s British First Army. In the mountains of central Tunisia, on the ridge known as the Eastern Dorsal, the poorly armed French XIX Corps held the line under General Alphonse Juin. To the south of it, around Gafsa and with its rear in Tébessa in Algeria, was deployed Major General Lloyd Fredendall’s US II Corps, with General Orlando Ward’s 1st Armored Division and part of the 34th Infantry Division. From the Dorsal mountains to the coast at Sfax was about a hundred kilometres. An Allied thrust in that direction would have cut Tunisia in two and separated Rommel’s army, which was just taking up positions on the Mareth Line, from Arnim’s forces around Tunis and Bizerte.

The Germans understood this and did not wait. On 30 January the 21st Panzer Division routed the French at the Faïd Pass, and belated American counter-attacks failed to retake it. The main passage through the Eastern Dorsal was in Axis hands. West of it stretched a wide, flat plain with the small town of Sidi Bou Zid – a road junction and the rear area of the American positions.

The Allied command was divided and badly organised. Dwight Eisenhower, from 11 February Allied Commander-in-Chief in North Africa under the new command arrangements agreed at Casablanca, directed the war from Algiers and kept a forward command post at Constantine under General Lucian Truscott. From the end of January Anderson coordinated the operations of all three national forces, but the French were reluctant to take orders from a Briton, and Fredendall issued his orders from the map. He seldom visited the front from his headquarters in a ravine near Tébessa, more than a hundred kilometres behind the line, where engineers were tunnelling shelters into the rock for his staff. Convinced that he knew the ground better than his divisional commanders, he assigned them positions down to company level – without ever having seen them on the ground.

The Axis plan

The idea for the attack came from Rommel. In early February he proposed to the Italian Comando Supremo that – before Bernard Montgomery could bring his forces up to the Mareth Line – they should strike at the Americans, smash their force and seize their depots at Tébessa. Arnim, who was not subordinate to Rommel, had plans of his own, however, and was reluctant to hand over his divisions. After a week of wrangling, with Field Marshal Albert Kesselring acting as mediator, a compromise of two operations was agreed. In Operation Frühlingswind (Spring Wind) the 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions of Arnim’s army were to cross the Eastern Dorsal and rout the Americans at Sidi Bou Zid. In Operation Morgenluft (Morning Breeze) Rommel’s battle group, made up of Afrika Korps units and the Italian Centauro Armoured Division, was to take Gafsa. How far to go after that was never settled – and this lack of a clear objective and of a single commander weighed on the whole operation.

The Allies expected an attack, but not at that point. Eisenhower’s intelligence staff, relying on decrypted German signals and on their own guesswork, concluded that the main blow would fall further north, through the Fondouk Pass. Anderson therefore held Combat Command B – the strongest formation of the 1st Armored Division – in reserve, far from Sidi Bou Zid. Sidi Bou Zid was defended by Combat Command A and Colonel Thomas Drake’s 168th Infantry Regiment. In accordance with Fredendall’s orders the infantry sat on isolated hills – Djebel Lessouda in the north and Djebel Ksaira and Garet Hadid in the south – too far apart to support one another, while the tanks stood on the plain between them.

On 13 February Eisenhower visited the front. That evening and night he toured the positions at Sidi Bou Zid, talked with officers and looked at the Faïd gap by moonlight. He left a few hours before German tanks came through it.

Valentine’s Day at Sidi Bou Zid

At 4 a.m. on 14 February, under cover of a sandstorm, two battle groups of the 10th Panzer Division emerged from the Faïd Pass and went round Djebel Lessouda on both sides, while two groups of the 21st Panzer Division crossed the Maizila Pass to the south and swung round towards Sidi Bou Zid from the west. According to figures cited in the literature, the Germans had some 140 tanks in the attack, including a few heavy Tigers. They were supported by dive bombers, which attacked the American columns almost unhindered.

Combat Command A tried to counter-attack, but its M4 Sherman and older M3 tanks ran into the fire of German 88 mm guns and tanks in favourable positions. By evening the formation had lost 44 tanks and many guns and had fallen back a dozen or so kilometres west to Djebel Hamra. Sidi Bou Zid had fallen. The infantry on the hills was cut off: on Djebel Lessouda the force of Lieutenant Colonel John Waters, son-in-law of General George Patton; on Djebel Ksaira and Garet Hadid the main body of Drake’s regiment. Drake asked for permission to withdraw while there was still time; Fredendall ordered him to hold on and wait for relief.

A failed counter-attack and the loss of Gafsa

The Allied command still did not believe this was the main blow. Anderson released only one tank battalion from Combat Command B in reserve, and General Ward formed Combat Command C from it and other units. On the afternoon of 15 February this force advanced across the flat, open plain towards Sidi Bou Zid to free the infantry on the hills. It was bombed from the air by German aircraft, and when it came closer it drove right between the two panzer divisions. The attacking tank battalion was almost completely destroyed: the Americans lost 46 medium tanks and more than a hundred other vehicles. The remnants withdrew to Djebel Hamra.

The same day Operation Morgenluft began in the south. On the night of 14–15 February Anderson, fearing that Gafsa would be cut off, ordered it to be abandoned and the defence moved to the hills near Fériana. On the morning of 15 February the German-Italian Afrika Korps battle group entered the empty town. On 17 February it took Fériana and the airfields at Thélepte, which the Americans had to abandon, hastily burning their fuel stocks and unserviceable aircraft.

The men of the 168th Regiment cut off on the hills were left without help. On the nights of 15–16 and 16–17 February they tried to break through on foot across the plain to their own lines. Few succeeded. According to American studies some 1,400–1,500 men were taken prisoner, including Colonel Drake and Lieutenant Colonel Waters, who then spent two years in a German prisoner-of-war camp.

On 16 February the Germans attacked Sbeitla, where Ward had gathered the remnants of his division and the fresh Combat Command B. During the night panic broke out among the retreating units, but Combat Command B held the town for another day, covering the withdrawal. With Eisenhower’s consent Anderson soon ordered the whole Eastern Dorsal to be abandoned and the defence moved to the western ridge of the mountains, the Western Dorsal. On 17 February the Americans gave up Sbeitla and fell back towards the Kasserine and Sbiba passes. According to a tally cited in the literature, II Corps lost more than 2,500 men, 103 tanks, some 280 other vehicles and several dozen guns in the fighting of 14–17 February. German losses were small.

Disputes on the Axis side

The victory was clear-cut but not exploited. Rommel, encouraged by the easy capture of Gafsa, wanted to push on – through the Kasserine Pass to Tébessa and the American depots in Algeria, and then into the rear of the British First Army. Arnim considered that the aim of the operation had been achieved and wanted his divisions back for his own attacks in the north. On 18 February Rommel put his plan to Kesselring, who passed it on to Rome. The Comando Supremo’s reply, which arrived the next day, gave Rommel both panzer divisions but directed the attack not towards Tébessa but north, towards Thala and Le Kef. So began the Battle of the Kasserine Pass.

Significance

Sidi Bou Zid was the first major armoured clash between the Americans and the Germans, and it ended in a heavy American defeat. In four days II Corps lost almost half an armoured division and most of an infantry regiment, and the front in central Tunisia was pushed back by several dozen kilometres. The causes were obvious at once: forces dispersed on hills that could not support one another, the command’s sluggish reactions, faulty intelligence, the lack of air cover and the inexperience of soldiers who were meeting Rommel’s and Arnim’s troops for the first time. The Germans concluded that the Americans, though superbly equipped, were a weak opponent. It would soon become clear how wrong they were.

A few days later, at Kasserine and Thala, the Americans and British halted Rommel’s further advance. Eisenhower changed the command: on 6 March General George Patton replaced Fredendall, with General Omar Bradley as his deputy. The US Army stopped dispersing its units and improved cooperation between infantry, tanks, artillery and aircraft, and two months later it was already fighting effectively in Tunisia. The lessons of Sidi Bou Zid paid off later in Italy and France.