Mussolini decides to attack Greece

On the morning of 15 October 1940, in his office in the Palazzo Venezia in Rome, Benito Mussolini assembled six men: the Foreign Minister, Galeazzo Ciano; the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Pietro Badoglio; the Under-Secretary of State for War, General Ubaldo Soddu; the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff, General Mario Roatta; the King’s Lieutenant-General in Albania, Francesco Jacomoni; and the commander of the Italian forces in Albania, General Sebastiano Visconti Prasca. The minutes, taken by Lieutenant Colonel Trombetti, open with the Duce’s words: “The purpose of this meeting is to define the manner in which the action I have decided to begin against Greece is to be carried out.” The meeting ended at 12.30 p.m. Its outcome was a plan that Mussolini summed up in one sentence: “an offensive in Epirus, observation of and pressure on Salonika, and in a second phase the march on Athens”.

War chronologies often state that on this day Mussolini and his closest advisers “decided” to attack Greece. In fact the decision had been taken several days earlier, and by Mussolini alone: on 12 October the Duce announced it to Ciano, on 13 October he passed it on to Badoglio, and on 14 October he fixed the date. The meeting of 15 October did not decide whether to strike, only how to do it. None of those present demanded that the attack be abandoned.

An answer to a fait accompli

The immediate trigger was Romania. In early October German troops of the military mission began to arrive in the country; officially the mission was to train General Ion Antonescu’s army and protect the oilfields of Ploiești. The first transports set off on 8 October, and the first soldiers reached Romania around 10–12 October. As recently as 4 October Mussolini and Adolf Hitler had met at the Brenner Pass, but Hitler had not said a word to his ally about moving into Romania, which Rome, after the Second Vienna Award, regarded as an area under the joint guarantee of both states. As early as 8 October an angry Mussolini telephoned Ciano and told him to induce Bucharest to ask for Italian troops as well. The Romanians did not ask.

On 12 October the Duce returned to Rome. That day Ciano recorded his words in his diary: “Hitler always faces me with a fait accompli. This time I am going to pay him back in his own coin. He will find out from the papers that I have occupied Greece. In this way the balance will be restored.” Asked whether he had already spoken to Badoglio, he replied that he had not yet, “but I shall resign as an Italian if anyone objects to our fighting the Greeks”. Ciano added for his own part that in his view the operation would be “useful and easy”.

Romania, however, was only the last straw. Since June Mussolini had been waging a “parallel war”: he wanted to win spoils for Italy in the Mediterranean and the Balkans with his own forces, not as Germany’s helper. Yet in France it was the Germans who had reaped the fruits of victory, over England the Luftwaffe was fighting alone, and in Africa Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, who in September had halted at Sidi Barrani, answered orders to advance further with repeated requests for delay. On 16 October he sent a report showing that he needed at least another two months before resuming the march on Egypt. A swift victory over Greece was to give Italy the success the desert was not delivering, and to show Berlin that Rome, too, could act on its own.

A plan left on the shelf

Greece was not a new target. Since the conquest of Albania in April 1939 Ciano had treated that country as his own fief and saw Greece as the natural direction for further expansion, while Mussolini had had “scores to settle” with the Greeks ever since the Corfu incident of 1923. In the summer of 1940 the General Staff drew up the plan “Emergenza G” (or “Esigenza G”): based on a study by General Carlo Geloso, it envisaged the occupation of Epirus as far as the Gulf of Arta, and of the Ionian Islands, with eight to eleven divisions. It assumed, however, that Bulgaria would attack Greece at the same time, or that Athens would accept occupation without a fight.

In August Ciano and Jacomoni unleashed a campaign against Greece in the Italian and Albanian press. Its pretext was the death of Daut Hoxha, the leader of an armed band from Chameria, who was presented as an Albanian patriot murdered by Greek agents, although he had been killed in a feud between bands. On 12 August Mussolini received Jacomoni and Visconti Prasca; both assured him that the operation was possible, even easy, provided it began at once. Three days later an Italian submarine sank the cruiser Elli off Tinos. At that point, however, Berlin made it clear that it wanted no disturbances in the Balkans, from which the Reich drew oil and grain, and on 22 August Mussolini postponed the strike against Greece until the end of September. After that his attention was taken up by the offensive in Egypt and by preparations for an attack on Yugoslavia (likewise halted at Germany’s demand).

At the beginning of October everything suggested that there would be no war in the Balkans that year. On 2 October Mussolini agreed with Soddu, who in practice ran the War Ministry (the Duce himself was formally minister), on a large-scale demobilisation for the winter: according to Italian studies, about 600,000 soldiers were to go home, and only some 20 divisions were to remain at full strength. The troops in Albania were ordered to pull back from their positions near the border into winter quarters. As late as 11 October Badoglio told the chiefs of staff that the Greek question had been shelved.

Three days of change

On 13 October, informed by Soddu of the Duce’s decision, Badoglio ordered all the forces provided for in the Emergenza G plan to be ready for action on 26 October. The next day he and Roatta were summoned to Mussolini. They learned that the aim was no longer Epirus but the occupation of the whole of Greece. Roatta replied that this would require about twenty divisions and that moving the missing ones to Albania would take at least three months; he also suggested limiting the demobilisation. According to some historians, the two generals advised replacing Visconti Prasca, a corps commander relatively junior in rank, with someone more senior and experienced. Mussolini agreed to this only for appearances’ sake and would not give way on the date. On 14 October Ciano noted that the Duce had fixed the date for 26 October and that Jacomoni was assuring him that the population of Chameria was well disposed towards the Italians.

Badoglio and Roatta evidently did not believe the attack would really happen: in the preceding months Mussolini had several times announced and then called off expeditions against Greece and Yugoslavia. They were counting on playing for time rather than on open opposition.

The meeting at the Palazzo Venezia

At the start of the meeting Mussolini set out the objectives. In the first phase the Italians were to occupy “the whole southern Albanian coast” (that is, the Greek coast of Epirus, which they regarded as Albanian Chameria), the Ionian Islands – Corfu, Cephalonia and Zakynthos – and Salonika, which would improve their position against Britain in the Mediterranean. In the second phase, or simultaneously, there was to be “the complete occupation of Greece”, so that the country would remain for ever within Italy’s political and economic sphere. The date – 26 October – “cannot be delayed even by an hour”. The Duce insisted that he had been maturing this decision “for months”, indeed since before the war. He foresaw no complications: Yugoslavia would keep quiet, Turkey would not move now that the Germans were in Romania, and Bulgaria, to which he was promising access to the Aegean, could become “a pawn in our game”. British help in the form of troops he ruled out “absolutely”.

Jacomoni said that Albania was awaiting the war “impatiently and with enthusiasm”, but he admitted something that should have alarmed his listeners: two months earlier the Greeks had not seemed inclined to put up serious resistance, whereas now they were determined to defend themselves. He described Greek public opinion as “ostentatiously indifferent” and the mood of the population as “deeply depressed”. Ciano added that there was a clear divide between the mass of the population and a narrow “plutocratic” ruling class that kept pro-British sentiment alive, and that the people were “indifferent to all events, including our invasion”. None of the reports from the legation in Athens gave any grounds for such an assessment; after the sinking of the Elli they reported, if anything, growing Greek hostility towards Italy. The minister in Athens, Emanuele Grazzi, kept in the dark for months about Rome’s intentions, was not summoned to the meeting.

Visconti Prasca was the most self-assured of those present. He said he had about 70,000 men in Albania (excluding special battalions) against roughly 30,000 Greeks in Epirus – a two-to-one superiority. The Greek air force “does not exist for him”, and Greek soldiers “are not men who like to fight”. According to fuller accounts of the minutes, he assured those present that the operation had been prepared “down to the smallest detail” and was “as perfect as is humanly possible”, and that its course would give the impression of “a crushing defeat within a few days”. The capture of Epirus and the port of Preveza was to be the starting point for the march on Athens, 250 kilometres away; Salonika would take “a couple of months”, because the port of disembarkation at Durrës lay 300 kilometres further off. For the first stage of the march on Athens, in his view, three additional mountain divisions would suffice, which could be shipped to the Gulf of Arta in a single night. When Roatta, spreading out a map, pointed out that on the way a mountain range 2,000 metres high had to be crossed, Visconti Prasca replied that there were plenty of mule tracks through it and assured him that he had traversed them many times.

Mussolini also raised the question of a pretext. The general justification was to be that Greece was an ally of Italy’s enemies, but “an incident is needed”. Jacomoni proposed clashes between the Chams and the Greek authorities; Visconti Prasca reported that he had French weapons and bombs ready for a staged attack. The Duce admitted that this had “absolutely negligible value” for him and was merely to “make a bit of smoke”. When Ciano asked when the incident was to take place, Mussolini replied: “On the 24th.” “On the 24th there will be an incident,” the minister assured him. The Duce added that “nobody will believe in this necessity”, and told those present not to worry unduly about losses.

Badoglio and Roatta

The only one to voice reservations was Badoglio. He praised Visconti Prasca’s plan for Epirus, but said that stopping at Epirus made no sense: if Italy wanted to occupy Greece, it would also have to take Crete and the Peloponnese. That would require about twenty divisions, and there were nine in Albania plus one cavalry division, so three months would be needed. Roatta calculated that there was the equivalent of eleven divisions in Albania and called for the transports to be speeded up, “so as not to give the impression that we are out of breath for the further march”. Neither of them, however, demanded that the date be put back or questioned the assumptions. The chiefs of staff of the navy, Admiral Domenico Cavagnari, and of the air force, General Francesco Pricolo, were not invited to the Palazzo Venezia, even though the operation required landings on the islands and command of the air. Mussolini merely assured those present that at least 400 aircraft would go into action, and Soddu that Škoda anti-aircraft guns received from Germany would go to Albania.

After the meeting Visconti Prasca and the commander of the air force in Albania, General Ferruccio Ranza, explained the details of their plans to Ciano at the Palazzo Chigi. Mussolini approved the minutes the next day, 16 October, at 2 p.m.

The British historian Ian Kershaw called this meeting one of “the most superficial and dilettante discussions of a risky military strategy ever recorded”. The objectives were discussed, but not the winter weather in the mountains of Epirus, the numbers of mules and lorries or the capacity of the Albanian ports, nor Greek mobilisation plans, nor the effect of the demobilisation just ordered, which was not rescinded.

Last hesitations

The doubts returned two days later. On 17 October Badoglio convened the chiefs of staff of the three services, and all three spoke out against the expedition: Roatta considered the forces in Albania insufficient, Pricolo complained that the air force was dispersed (part of it was just being sent to Belgium as the Corpo Aereo Italiano to fight Britain), and Cavagnari warned that the fleet, busy escorting convoys to Libya, was in no position to carry out a landing at Preveza, where the water was too shallow. Badoglio repeated this to Ciano and, according to Soddu, even threatened to resign. Mussolini flew into a rage and declared that if the marshal resigned, his resignation would be accepted at once. Badoglio, however, did not resign, and on 18 October, in conversation with the Duce, he did not even repeat his objections and secured only a two-day delay. The attack was moved to 28 October; its coincidence with the anniversary of the March on Rome was accidental.

One after another the plan’s assumptions fell apart. Ciano’s chef de cabinet, Filippo Anfuso, took a letter from Mussolini to Tsar Boris III in Sofia; the Tsar, fearing Turkey above all, gave an evasive reply, and Bulgaria did not join the war. Athens, warned by its diplomats, was preparing for the worst. Mussolini informed Hitler in a letter written on 19 October and sent several days later, in which he mentioned his intentions towards Greece but neither the form nor the date, because, as Ciano noted, he “fears that another order to stop us may come”. The border incidents which, according to Italian communiqués, occurred in the last days before the attack were staged, as agreed at the Palazzo Venezia, and served as the justification for the ultimatum.

Place in the war

On the night of 27–28 October the minister, Grazzi, delivered the ultimatum to the Prime Minister, Ioannis Metaxas, and at dawn Visconti Prasca’s troops crossed the Greek–Albanian border. The course of the Greco-Italian War laid bare everything that had been overlooked on 15 October. The Greeks under General Alexandros Papagos not only halted the Italians in the mountains of Epirus but in November went over to the counter-offensive and advanced into Albania. Visconti Prasca lost his command after only two weeks, and on 4 December 1940 Mussolini himself accepted Badoglio’s resignation. That same day the Duce, crushed by the news from the front, said to Ciano: “Every man makes one fatal mistake in his life. I made mine when I believed General Visconti Prasca.” In January 1941 he repeated: “Had anyone foreseen on 15 October what happened afterwards, I would have had him shot.”

The decision that was to prove Italy’s independence from Germany had the opposite effect. The “parallel war” ended in the winter of 1940–1941, when Italy, beaten in Albania and in North Africa, had to ask the Reich for help. The British, called in by the Greeks, occupied Crete and sent air units to Greece, which Hitler regarded as a threat to Romanian oil and to the southern flank of the coming war against the USSR. In April 1941 the Wehrmacht attacked Yugoslavia and Greece, and the Greek forces in Epirus capitulated at the end of the month. The failed expedition, planned in the course of a single morning meeting at the Palazzo Venezia, thus dragged the Balkans into the war, forced the Germans into a campaign they had not planned, and turned Italy, which in June 1940 had entered the war as a great power, into the Reich’s junior partner.