The Soviet–Estonian Mutual Assistance Pact

Around midnight on 28–29 September 1939, in the Kremlin, Vyacheslav Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars and People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and the Estonian foreign minister, Karl Selter, signed a pact of mutual assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Estonia, dated 28 September. The agreement, concluded for ten years, allowed the Soviet Union to establish naval and air bases on the islands of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa and in the port of Paldiski, while a confidential supplementary protocol gave it the right to keep up to 25,000 troops in Estonia for the whole duration of the war in Europe. In return the USSR gave assurances that the pact would in no way infringe Estonia’s sovereignty, political system or economy. The talks were held in the presence of Joseph Stalin, under the threat of invasion, and their outcome was decided by the superiority of the Red Army concentrated on the border. The Estonian pact was the first of three “bases pacts” which in the autumn of 1939 opened the way for the Red Army into the Baltic states.

The ultimatum and Tallinn’s reply

Four days earlier, on 24 September, Molotov had demanded of Selter, who had come to Moscow to sign a trade agreement, a mutual assistance pact with bases for the fleet and air force. The pretext was the escape of the submarine Orzeł, interned in Tallinn, which was supposed to prove that Estonia was incapable of guarding its neutrality. Estonia was alone. Latvia and Finland did not want to become involved, Britain and France could not help in the Baltic, and Germany, which in June had concluded a non-aggression pact with Estonia, had already in August assigned it to the Soviet sphere of interest in the secret protocol to the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, and was now advising it to accept Moscow’s terms. According to the Estonian general staff, some 160,000 troops, 600 tanks and 600 aircraft stood on the border, and for several days Soviet warships and aircraft had been ostentatiously violating Estonian waters and airspace. President Konstantin Päts and the commander-in-chief, General Johan Laidoner, concluded that the threat was no bluff and that war would mean the annihilation of the nation. The government and the parliamentary committees agreed to negotiate.

On 27 September a delegation arrived in Moscow: Selter; the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, Jüri Uluots; the professor of international law and former foreign minister Ants Piip; and the envoy in Moscow, August Rei. They asked for talks to begin the following day, but the Kremlin summoned them that same evening.

The Metallist affair and 35,000 troops

At 9 p.m. Selter declared that Estonia agreed in principle to negotiate on the basis of the Soviet draft but wished to propose amendments, and he protested against the violations of Estonian waters and airspace. Molotov replied with “bad news”. He read out a TASS dispatch according to which an unknown submarine had torpedoed and sunk the Soviet ship Metallist in Narva Bay, and many sailors had drowned. In view of this, the Soviet government could no longer be satisfied with its earlier demands and wanted the right to keep up to 35,000 infantry, cavalry and air force troops in various places in Estonia for the whole duration of the European war, partly in order to “protect the internal order” of Estonia.

Estonian and Polish historians agree that the sinking of the Metallist was a provocation. According to Estonian findings, the ship dropped anchor in Narva Bay on 27 September; in the afternoon three vessels of the Baltic Fleet came alongside and took off the crew, and at dusk the ship was sunk. Soviet radio immediately announced that an “unknown submarine” had done it. The Orzeł was by then far away in the central Baltic, and she had put ashore on Gotland, several days earlier, the two Estonian guards she had carried off – a fact of which Selter was aware. The incident was meant to give Moscow a pretext for new demands and, should the negotiations fail, for war as well.

Selter replied that the new demand would mean the military occupation of Estonia and was unacceptable. Molotov suggested that the Estonians talk to Stalin and telephoned for him: “Comrade Stalin, come here. Mr Selter and his colleagues object to our new proposal. They call it an occupation.” Stalin appeared a few minutes later and repeated Molotov’s arguments. The Estonian delegation managed to have the conversation postponed until the following day so that it could prepare a draft of its own.

Haggling over numbers

At 1 p.m. on 28 September the talks resumed. At the same time Joachim von Ribbentrop, who had flown into Moscow the day before to sign the Boundary and Friendship Treaty, was in the Kremlin, and in Warsaw the defence of the capital was capitulating. The Estonians presented a draft in which the bases were confined to the islands of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa. “That is unacceptable. We need Tallinn,” Stalin replied. Selter retorted that the capital could not be handed over. In the end they settled on the islands and the port of Paldiski, west of Tallinn, and the confidential protocol added that until the base at Paldiski had been fitted out, for no longer than two years, the Soviet fleet could use the port of Tallinn. The Estonians proposed that the garrisons should number at most 10,000 troops. Stalin and Molotov considered 25,000 “absolutely necessary”. “Do not force us to look for other possibilities,” they said, while assuring the Estonians that they did not intend to act as Germany had in Czechoslovakia and that the garrisons would remain only for the duration of the war. The delegation conferred on the spot and accepted 25,000 as the upper limit. Stalin also haggled over the deadline for ratification. When Selter explained that he wanted to see his wife and son on Sunday, Stalin asked how old the boy was and added one day “for the wife and son”: ratification was to take place within six days.

Some accounts state that Estonia agreed to Soviet bases with 30,000 troops. According to the text of the protocol and the delegation’s notes, the limit was 25,000 ground and air force troops. The figure of 35,000 was the demand of 27 September, which the Estonians rejected.

When the talks were over, Stalin turned to Selter: “The same could have happened to you as happened to Poland. Poland was a great country. Where is Poland now? Where are Mościcki, Rydz-Śmigły and Beck?” He assured him that Estonia had acted wisely. When Selter complained about Soviet aircraft flying over Estonia, Stalin replied that these were “young, inexperienced airmen” who made mistakes, and that it would not happen again. At dinner toasts were drunk to President Päts, to Selter and to Laidoner. Selter later recalled that after the signing Molotov telephoned someone he called “Klim” – presumably the People’s Commissar for Defence, Kliment Voroshilov – and ordered the state of readiness to be called off. That night Estonian soldiers on the border saw Soviet signal flares, and then tanks hidden in the undergrowth moving off to the east. The same night the trade agreement for which Selter had originally come to Moscow was also signed.

What the pact provided

The preamble referred to the Treaty of Tartu of 1920 and the non-aggression pact of 1932 as the enduring basis of mutual relations. Article I bound the parties to render each other assistance, including military assistance, in the event of a direct attack, or threat of attack, by any great European power on their maritime frontiers in the Baltic, on their land frontiers through the territory of Latvia, or on the Soviet bases. In Article II the USSR undertook to help the Estonian army acquire armaments on favourable terms. Article III gave the Soviet Union the right to naval bases and airfields on Saaremaa, Hiiumaa and at Paldiski, leased at a reasonable price and guarded by Soviet ground and air forces in “strictly limited” numbers. Article IV prohibited the conclusion of alliances directed against the other party, and Article V stated that the pact must in no way affect the sovereign rights of the parties, or their economic and state systems, and that the base areas would remain Estonian territory. The pact was to remain in force for ten years and to be extended automatically for five more unless it was denounced. Besides the limit of 25,000 troops and the use of Tallinn by the fleet, the confidential protocol contained, at the Estonians’ request, a provision that assistance was not automatic. The instruments of ratification were exchanged in Tallinn on 4 October.

On 29 September Päts spoke on the radio, assuring his listeners that the pact did not infringe Estonian sovereignty and that the state remained independent. The government of Kaarel Eenpalu soon resigned; Uluots became prime minister and Piip foreign minister. Selter left for Geneva as a diplomat.

Latvia next in line

On 28 September Soviet troops were massing on the Latvian border, and Soviet aircraft were violating Latvian airspace. Soviet operational plans of those days provided that if Latvia sided with Estonia, the 7th Army would strike towards Riga. At Selter’s request the Estonian envoy in Riga asked the Latvian foreign minister, Vilhelms Munters, what Latvia would do if it received similar demands. He was told that there would probably be no alternative to concluding such an agreement. A few days later Munters was summoned to Moscow, and on 5 October he signed a mutual assistance pact that gave the USSR bases at Liepāja, Ventspils and on the coast of Courland. On 10 October Lithuania was forced to sign a similar agreement. In return its foreign minister, Juozas Urbšys, received Wilno (Vilnius) with part of the Wilno region, taken by the Red Army during its invasion of Poland, and he agreed to 20,000 Soviet troops in the country. Lithuania had passed into the Soviet sphere of interest under an agreement that Ribbentrop and Molotov had signed on the same day as the Estonian pact. Finland, invited to Moscow on 5 October, refused to make concessions and was attacked on 30 November.

Its place in the war

Soviet troops began entering Estonia on 18 October. Already during the military talks in Tallinn at the beginning of October, the delegation of the commander of the Leningrad Military District, Kirill Meretskov, had demanded locations not provided for in the pact, among them the Haapsalu area and airfields in western Estonia, and Moscow withdrew only some of these demands. Before long there were more Red Army soldiers stationed in Estonia than the entire Estonian army numbered, and in February 1940 the Estonian government protested that the Soviet contingent had exceeded the agreed 25,000. During the Winter War Soviet aircraft took off from bases in Estonia to raid Finland. Meanwhile, at Hitler’s summons, the Baltic Germans were leaving the Baltic states.

The assurances of respect for independence lasted less than nine months. On 16 June 1940, while the world’s attention was focused on the fall of France, the USSR accused Estonia and Latvia of violating the pacts and demanded changes of government and the admission of an unlimited number of troops. On 17 June the Red Army occupied Estonia. Under the supervision of Moscow’s emissary, Andrei Zhdanov, a compliant government was formed, single-list elections were held in July, and on 6 August 1940 Estonia was incorporated into the USSR as the Estonian SSR. Päts and Laidoner were deported into the interior of the Soviet Union and died there, Piip died in captivity, and in June 1941 the NKVD deported thousands of people from the country. The mutual assistance pact that was supposed to protect Estonia from the “great European powers” proved to be the first stage of its occupation, which, with an interval of German occupation in 1941–1944, lasted until 1991.